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DECIPHERING "SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT"*
CHRISTOPHER

D.

STONE**

"Sustainable development" is increasingly surfacing in discussions, in policy documents, and even in international agreements.
Professor He!en Endre-Stacy has several objections to the term and to
the ways in which it is used. Sustainable development is a "still slippery concept" 1 that is "trapped by its own (self-imposed) boundaries ' 2 and must "enliven itself" with "revitalized ideas of community
and precaution."' 3 Above all, the term lends itself "to seal the intellec'4
tual chasm between the developmentalist and the environmentalist."
Much of Endre-Stacy's paper-on either side of her dispatch on developments in Australia-is an attempt to draw from a "postmaterialist" vision of society cues for bridging this chasm.
Other commentators might have been found who would have reflected more deferentially on these verdicts in the context of EndreStacy's larger project, which is "to undermine the coherence of the
very idea of poststructuralism, whilst accepting its targets of critique."'5 Even at this stage, her agenda-to cross-illuminate trouble in
the environment with fashion in intellectual theory-is formidable.
Many of the authors whose writings have inspired Endre-Stacy, 6 and
whose style she emulates, while professing concern for language regrettably use it-indeed, treat it-rather badly, and in a manner that
frustrates formation of the "inclusive" community they prescribe. In
my experience, the effort of prodding through the mounds of jargon,
commonly unmortared by any logic (apparently dropped from the
building code), is seldom rewarded by any genuine, novel insights
awaiting on the other side. Endre-Stacy, or her other readers, may
have better luck or fortitude.
* Based on comments delivered on Helen Endre-Stacy's Sustaining ESD in Australia, 69
CHI. KENT L. REV., 935, at the Chicago-Kent Conference on The New Ecology and the Law,
October, 1993.
** Roy P. Crocker Professor of Law, University of Southern California.
1. Helen Endre-Stacy, SustainingESD in Australia, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 935, 935 (1994).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 936.
5. Id. at 959 n.96.
6. See, e.g., JOROEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon

Press 1975) (1973).
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On the merits of what I do decipher, I find myself more tolerant
than Endre-Stacy that an ill-defined term has worked its way into authoritative documents. In international agreements in particular one
should expect certain key phrases, and indeed many instruments as a
whole, to be diplomatically inexplicit. Domestic legislation ordinarily
requires only majority vote, but in the international arena a unanimity
rule prevails: a majority of states cannot drag a reluctant minority into
a convention. The dynamics invite equivocal language, which, particularly in the early (framework-setting) stages, can mask a failed consensus in a way that permits negotiations to continue while differences
get, hopefully, resolved. The fact that "sustainable development"
means different things to different people is, in this context, understandable, even an asset.
So far as there is an enduring problem, I find the root to be less
the "intellectual chasm" between "developmentalists" and "environmentalists" that Endre-Stacy suggests, than it is a conflict of interests.
The developmentalists include much of the world that is poor and getting poorer and laboring to repay international debt and feed itself
from day to day. People who are so prematerial that they have never
seen indoor plumbing are not an easy sell for "postmaterialism." If
there is a choice between turning a hardwood forest into lumber and
preserving it as a habitat for exotic creatures or as a genetic library
that may pay medicinal dividends in the mid-twenty-first century, the
poor will opt for the lumber and cash. The environmentalists include
many constituencies in the developed countries who value conservation, even if it comes at the cost of economic development (perhaps
particularly someone else's). Well-fed, well-clothed, and well-housed,
they will often judge the nonmarket-measured value in a forest area
(its beauty and biodiversity) to exceed its market appropriable value
7
(its lumber and latex).
In other words, the term "sustainable development" is not merely
vague-a masker of failed consensus-the way key terms in the U.S.
Constitution are vague and require case by case elaboration. "Sustainable development" functions to gloss over not only failed consensus, but a latent collision course. The chasm is less a failure of
language, as Endre-Stacy maintains, than a poignant tussle between,
roughly, Rich and Poor. The indigenous native who extinguishes a
7. Endre-Stacy relays that in a conservationist mood the Resource Assessment Commission adjudged water "to hold intrinsic value, though this value was not quantified in monetary
terms." Endre-Stacy, supra note 1, at 942.
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species for food is not trapped in orthodox semantics of conventional
prematerialist homo economus' cost-benefit analysis." He is trapped
in hunger (just as we, the rich, are so often trapped in moral blindness). There is no reason to suppose that killing off a species pains
him less than it does us. And at any rate the dilemma is not one that
logotherapy, the academic's favored home remedy, will cure.
We saw this tragic friction played out on a large scale at the
United Nations' 1992 "Earth Summit" in Rio. The Confererce was
convened in the name of Environment and Development. The Rich's
diplomats deplaned wanting, mainly, Environment; those of the Poor,
mainly, Development. The text that emerged was more heavily
weighted towards Development because the poor countries outnumber the rich. Their message was clear and united: "Don't tell us what
to do with our forests." Protection of the environment, with fewer
supporters, received relatively less tribute than it had in Stockholm
twenty years earlier. 9
Whatever the roots of the lingering tensions, the impasse between
environmentalists and conservationists is not insurmountable. Those
who are observing and commenting on the process should try to find
ways of conceiving problems and addressing areas of activity in which
multiple constituencies can be satisfied-or, at least, no one made less
well-off. The negotiating space includes a region of potential alliances
for cooperative gains, even if cooperation has to take the form of
debt-relief, forest "rentals," and transfer payments from rich to
poor. 10 Hence, Endre-Stacy is right to call our attention to aspects of
the intellectual environment that make some of the friction more intractable than it needs to be. On the other hand, a common ground is
not to be established by deriding and dismissing the language of economics and social choice theory. The gap between these fields and
environmental ethics can be bridged (or better, their interests woven)
to the benefit of both "sides," but both have to listen." Environmentalists commonly are inclined to underestimate how flexibly the
frameworks of economics can accommodate many, although probably
not all, of the interests and values for which they wish to speak.
8. See id. at 954.
9. For two good evaluations of the Earth Summit, see Marc Pallermaerts, International
Environmental Law from Stockholm to Rio: Back to the Future?, in GREENING INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1 (Philippe Sands ed., 1994) (emphasizing the set-backs), and, less pessimistically, Ileana M.
Porras, The Rio Declaration:A New Basis for InternationalCooperation,in GREENING INTERNATIONAL LAW supra, at 20.
10. See CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, THE GNAT IS OLDER THAN MAN 39-45 (1993).
11. See AMARTYA K. SEN, ON ETHICS AND EcoNoMIcs (1987).
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Indeed, Endre-Stacy reports that in one of the mining disputes, a
survey based on contingent valuation ("CV"), an economic tool, indicated that the amount Australians reported themselves willing to pay
to preserve a National Park outweighed the $82 million that would be
gained from mining it.12 In other words, a robust cost-benefit analysis
sided with conservation and the aboriginals. She reports that the contingent valuation was criticized on several grounds, 13 but stops short
of sharing with us where she herself would have come out if she were
speaking, say, in one of the broadly participatory, local-level consulting forums that she favors.' 4 Would she renounce any discussion in
CV terms because it would backtrack us to an obsolete "code of or15
thodox discourse"?
Settling the differences that the phrase "sustainable development" cloaks requires more than shifting among "discourses." There
are issues of substance and strategy involved. But the strategy depends upon characteristics of the situation-the substance-that vary
from case to case.
First, there undoubtedly exist many projects where developmental and environmental goals are virtually congruent. These win-win
cases should be identified, coalitions strengthened, and the indicated
solutions vigorously pursued. On the positive side, energy conservation and transfer of technology present clear opportunities for mutual
gain. 16 And there is room for alliances designed to stall actions where
the pause works to mutual advantage. Fred Pearce's study of massive
water projects documents how commonly such undertakings have disrupted local economies at the same time they were devastating the
environment.' 7 Whatever else "sustainable development" is, the term
is not pure sham, but often an earnest invitation to constructive cooperation. Indeed, considering their limited resources, the relevant international agencies, including the United Nations Environmental
Program, the Global Environmental Facility, and the Commission on
Sustainable Development, may find their hands full just identifying
and launching programs that are uncontroversially worthwhile to all
sides.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Endre-Stacy, supra note 1, at 943.
Id.
Id. at 968-69.
Id. at 954.

16. See NICHOLAS LENSSEN, EMPOWERING
(Worldwatch Paper No. 111, 1992).

DEVELOPMENT: THE NEW ENERGY EQUATION

17. See FRED PEARCE, THE DAMMED 181-202 and passim (1992); The Beautiful and the
Dammed, ECONOMIST, Mar. 28, 1992, at 93.
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In a second range of cases, where the mutual benefits are not
immediately evident, these same agencies are competent to perform
the investigation and education that alliance-building requires. Experience shows that the country sacrificing its environmental amenities
may be overlooking certain ominous causal links, or environmentally
benign alternatives. A searching inquiry may show that a seaside development which threatens a wildlife refuge does not pencil out favorably for the local economy either.
The tensions between environment and development get more
unruly when we enter a third level. Suppose that the project threatens
a wildlife refuge that is the traditional homeland of an indigenous people, but the project is economically sound. Now, in these cases it
seems fair to say that the antagonistic positions are likely to be described and advocated in different vocabularies. The pro-development position (the reasons favoring mining the National Park) is
spelled out in terms of economic value and discount rates. The arguments on the other side (favoring leaving the park undisturbed) are
likely to be expressed in the looser language of other, competing values, such as respect for nature and the honoring of national
commitments.
But conflicting values do not make differences irreconcilable.
Governments routinely resolve tensions between "efficiency" and
"fairness" (or equity) that are no less perplexing than those between
the environment and development at their most aloof. In fact, the
parallel is instructive. As Brian Barry has pointed out, just as preferences across a basket of ordinary commodities-grapes and potatoes-can be represented by indifference curves expressing marginal
preferences as a function of endowments, so can efficiency and fairness. 8 The less wealth we have, the more likely we are to sacrifice
advances in fairness for advances in wealth; and conversely, the better
we are fed and clothed, the more apt we are to sacrifice advances in
wealth for advances in equity values. Consistent patterns of indifference can meet standards of rationality, even if equity and efficiency
cannot be reduced to the same metric-indeed, even if neither can be
satisfactorily reduced to its own metric. The same appears to hold for
trade-offs between wealth and facets of the environment not captured
in markets, such as the existence value of dolphins. As wealth grows
(as countries become more developed) so too do populations, in general and by degrees, become readier to trade marginal wealth for mar18. BRIAN BARRY, POLITICAL ARGUMENT 3-6 (1965).
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ginal environmental amenities. One would expect this inclination to
display itself in contingent valuation surveys. 19 These surveys, moreover, are a perfectly sensible (though imperfectly realizable) way of
seeking a common denominator to reconcile the contending interests.
Forging cooperation among the parties may take more imagination
and patience. But it can be done.

The more intractable difficulties are introduced at a fourth level.
There are certain cases in which even the ideal CV survey (in which
respondents were fully informed, nonstrategic, and candid) would
leave us unsatisfied. Endre-Stacy's illustration of the Jawoyn people

might be a case in point. It is not at all clear that their claims-to
ancestral land and the preservation of their culture-ought to be measured by what others, who are not choosing the rules from behind a
veil of ignorance, say they are worth. 20 The surveyed others, who

have interests in conflict with those of the Jawoyn, cannot be impartial
or even (feelings considered) fully informed.
Endre-Stacy backs two contemporary proposals that may be intended to relieve or skirt the tensions between development and the
environment in cases of this sort. The first is "the precautionary principle" 21 and the second, a more widely participative style of govern-

ment, an ethic of dialogue. 22

That "the precautionary principle" has become as fashionable as

it has is a sad testament to the level of the new legal scholarship.
There is a large literature on risk management that deserves the attention of all of us concerned about environmental catastrophes. 23 Anyone who puts in the effort to read this stuff will learn, at a minimum,

that there is no "the" precautionary principle, but text-books full of
precautionary principles, plural. Risk management is complex-far
too complex to conclude (or stand pat on the proposition) that we

should take precautions against risks. Sure, if the costs of avoiding
19. Might this phenomenon explain why Northern Territory residents were bafflingly prepared to pay considerably less than the national average to ensure preservation of the proposed
mining venture Endre-Stacy relates? See Endre-Stacy, supra note 1, at 943.
20. I could not figure out from Endre-Stacy's account what the position of the Jawoyn people was towards the mining: were they against it because it compromised ancestral lands or for it
because it promised them marginal mining revenues, or for it on better terms than they were
offered? See id. at 947.
21. ld. at 969.
22. Id. at 966.
23. In fact, the notion of what some observers are fumbling for in terms of precaution may
be best addressed through a sophisticated concept of "quasi-option value." See Kenneth J. Arrow & Anthony C. Fisher, Environmental Preservation, Uncertainty, and Irreversibility, 88 Q. J.
EcoN. 312 (1974); Anthony C. Fisher & W. Michael Hanemann, Option Value and the Extinction
of Species, 4 ADVANCES APPLIED MICRO-ECoN. 169 (1986).
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risks are nil, let's get rid of them. But in real situations risk avoidance
(minimization) often carries a significant price tag. How much risk is
to be avoided at what cost? Further, risks ordinarily linger whichever
course we choose. On the one hand there are risks of burning fossil
fuels: we raise the probability that more energy will be retained in the
atmosphere, and, one way or the other, the added energy is almost
sure to break out in ways that are troublesome. On the other hand, a
rapid throttling of carbon use worldwide would lead to a rapid deceleration of the global economy, raising risks of it own-of massive unemployment, freezing, brown-outs, and widespread civil unrest. Being
cautious is no answer, because both policies, a continued use of carbon or a stifling of carbon, involve risks. Not that we are left to flip a
coin. We should try to figure out how much use of carbon, or of anything else, is most sensible; but it is unclear how the sensible resolution is drawn from "the precautionary principle."
In fact, Endre-Stacy's spin on the precautionary principle jaunts
her onto some pretty perilous thin ice. Her version endorses regulation "where there is no proof of a causal link between toxic emissions,
for example, and harm. '24 Is one permitted to ask how we know a
substance is "toxic" if there is no proof of a causal link to harm? In
the eyes of Endre-Stacy, who champions the unhorsing of elite authorities such as scientists and economists, the very raising of the question
undoubtedly exposes my delegitimacy.
I find a lot to like in Endre-Stacy's proposals about local participation. There are undoubtedly instances in which mistakes could
have been avoided had planners been more open and receptive to the
views of local populations before a project began. 25 And anyway,
good governments listen. One might draw from this an argument that
an ideal government (with infinite patience and pocketbook) is
obliged to hear out, even respect, everyone's views, even if, when all is
said and done, some of its plans proceed (perhaps in modified form)
anyway. In all events, we need, as Endre-Stacy indicates, improved
modes of public participation.
But what reforms would constitute improvement? Central to Endre-Stacy's vision is an "ideal of community as a horizontal and coop'27
erative sharing of information," 26 indeed, of "unceasing dialogue."
As a general principle, it is hard to take issue with openness, informa24.
25.
26.
27.

Endre-Stacy, supra note 1, at 969 (emphasis added).
See PEARCE, supra note 17, at 252-71 and passim.
Endre-Stacy, supra note 1, at 971.
Id. at 970.
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tion sharing, and public participation. Endre-Stacy particularly values
these as integral to her larger vision of community as a search "for
alternative, noncoercive forms of existence. ' 28 The problem is that
decisions have to be made, and dialogue and delay are costs. National
Parks have to be mined or not mined. Cities have to expand or not
expand. Discussion about individual projects (as opposed to dialog
about the good society) cannot go on forever. At some point, someone has to decide. A principle of sharing information, within limits, is
worthy-but is no substitute for a rule of decision.
On this score, I cannot pin down what Endre-Stacy's rule of decision is, perhaps because she is more interested, here, in an over-all
process (the integration of government with its communities, an independently vital question on which she has much to contribute) than in
the sequence of discrete resolutions that constitutes a government in
practice. We get a clearer idea what she does not like. She takes a
poke at the Australian ESD (Ecologically Sustainable Development)
process for being "activated by and acting out our Cartesian anxiety,"' 29 a token of new Criticism that is beyond my ken to decode. She
cues: "The tyranny of dualism meant that the only two available alternatives were well-mannered discussions, or someone or some interest
group being 'forced to take the medicine.' "30
But do we infer, then, that she would insist on consensus as a
condition of proceeding ahead? That would be the strong medicine.
Ensconcing unanimity as the collective choice rule is equivalent to giving each participant a veto power. The trouble is, telling participants
more and more about a problem, and even encouraging them empathetically to put themselves in the other person's shoes, does not
assure that disputants will converge on an agreement. In fact, clarifying their differences may only harden opposition. As a result, demanding consensus as a necessary condition of social change poses the
same risk as posed by her version of the precautionary principle: it is
likely simply to freeze the status quo-an ironic position for social
reformers to take. 31 The logjam would get worse if, as she appears to
28. Id. at 967.
29. Id. at 959 n.95.
30. Id.
31. Endre-Stacy acknowledges the criticisms this point stirred at her presentation in Chicago and marshals a response in the form of an ironic and I found feeble paraphrase of her
critics: "'They' (the locals) could not be trusted to do the right thing.., could not see beyond
their own noses. 'They' wanted to protect their own environmentally damaging job .... I detected a siege mentality. Environmental, political and legal strategies needed not so much to be
ambitious, as didactic." Id. at 964 (emphasis in original).
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recommend, just about everybody in Australia would be given a say in
just about every decision. But why stop the bounds of community at
Australia? Should not the decisions on Australian land use and fishing await input from (here I may be slipping into a pre-postmaterialist
term) "outsiders"?
These sentiments are not entirely wrong-headed. On the contrary, they put some ideal considerations on the table, and may encourage a circle of young scholars, not heretofore concerned with the
environment, to enter the discussions with some fresh and challenging
thought. But if so, they shall have to bone up on, and join, what Endre-Stacy rightly labels the "next phase," the growing body of literature that has gone on to address "how society is to make the transition
to ecologically sensitive decision making, and consider[s] the role of
institutions within that transition. ' 32 Write on.

32. Id. at 973.

